Market design driven negative imbalance prices by Brijs, Tom et al.
IEEE Young Researchers Symposium 2014, Ghent, Belgium                                                  
1 
 
Market Design Driven Negative Imbalance Prices 
Tom Brijs, Cedric De Jonghe, Kristof De Vos, Ronnie Belmans 
ELECTA, Department of Electrical Engineering (ESAT) 
University of Leuven (KU Leuven), founding member of EnergyVille 
Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001 Heverlee, Belgium 
tom.brijs@esat.kuleuven.be
 
 
Abstract—Many countries have experienced a rapid increase 
in the share of renewable power in electricity generation. This 
increases the need for system flexibility due to their limited 
controllability and predictability. Besides challenging the ability of 
power systems to meet peak demand, this gives rise to downward 
adequacy problems, i.e. the ability to cope with high renewable 
power injections during low demand. The need for downward 
flexibility is observed in Belgium during periods with negative 
electricity prices. This issue is referred to as the incompressibility 
of power systems and challenges further renewable power 
integration. The objective of this paper is to identify the regulatory 
mechanisms affecting negative imbalance prices. It is confirmed 
that negative prices in the balancing market result from the 
activation of negative downward reserve capacity bids from 
renewables generators, inflexible conventional power plants, the 
balance-incentivizing α-component in the settlement mechanisms, 
and expensive inter-TSO downward reserve capacity. 
Keywords—balancing market, negative prices, forecasting, 
reserve market design, renewable energy, regulatory framework 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Directive 2009/28/EC, binding goals are set for 2020, 
in which renewable energy will have to hold a 20% share in the 
final European energy demand, in which electricity generation 
is expected to bear the largest burden with 34.3% of total 
electricity demand with renewable energy sources (RES) [1]. 
Annual installations of RES, being wind, PV, hydro, and 
biomass, have increased significantly over the past decennia in 
Europe, resulting in a total installed capacity of respectively 
101.6 GW, 67.5 GW, 159.6 GW and 19.1 GW at the end of 
2012 [2]. Table 1 displays national RES statistics for the EU-28 
accompanied by Norway and Switzerland in terms of the 
installed capacities by the end of 2012. The mean penetration is 
defined as the annual electricity generation relative to total 
electricity consumption, and the maximum penetration as the 
installed capacity relative to minimum consumption levels 
(theoretical statistic). When analyzing the variable RES data, 
being wind and PV, as these are the RES affecting flexibility 
needs, it can be noted that Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain are leading the way, covering respectively 
30%, 14%, 16%, 21%, and 23% of their electricity consumption 
with variable RES. When comparing the installed capacity to 
the minimum demand, this may already result in instantaneous 
renewable generation levels that exceed the demand for 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However Table 
1 shows that other countries face lower penetration levels, 
trajectories show that they are also rapidly increasing their 
renewable generation mix taking into account the policy targets 
towards 2020. In addition, according to 2013 ENTSO-E 
projections it is expected that total installed RES capacity in 
Europe will reach more than 500 GW by 2020, representing an 
enormous growth relative to the 2013 level of 340 GW [3]. 
TABLE I. RELATIVE INSTALLED CAPACITY [%] AND PENETRATION [%] OF 
VARIABLE RES IN THE EU-28 + NO + CH [2]. 
 
 
The presence of variable RES increases the need for system 
flexibility, due to their output variations and prediction errors 
[4]. Expected power variations are covered in the forward 
market by means of flexible conventional power plants 
adapting their generation schedule to the predicted renewable 
generation. In contrast, unpredicted variations are to be 
compensated for in real-time, by means of the balancing 
market. The necessary system flexibility here comes from 
balancing service providers (BSPs) able to bridge this mismatch 
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in supply and demand in real-time through (1) flexible demand 
through demand response technologies, (2) flexible generation 
capacity that can deviate from their scheduled output profile, 
(3) flexible generation or demand from other control zones, (4) 
flexibility provided with energy storage, (5) and flexibility 
procured from the output control of RES. 
The impact of increasing shares of RES in the generation mix 
on security of supply has been a relevant point of discussing for 
a long time. Traditionally, focus of the debate was upward 
adequacy, i.e. the ability of power systems to meet peak demand 
and thus avoiding demand shedding and black-outs [5]. Today, 
increasing attention is paid towards the issue of downward 
adequacy, raising the question if the current power system is 
able to cope with periods of high renewable generation while 
facing low demand. In other words, is the power system able to 
adapt its generation or demand levels to maintain the balance 
between demand and supply. Today, limited downward 
flexibility is observed due to renewable generation with low 
marginal prices and generation support mechanisms such as 
priority dispatch or green certificates (e.g. wind), inflexible 
conventional power plants bound by technical ramping 
constraints (e.g. nuclear power plants), conventional power 
plants bound by must-run conditions due to the provision of 
ancillary services (e.g. combined-cycle gas turbines). In 
contrast to high electricity prices when facing limited upward 
flexibility, limited downward flexibility results in low or even 
negative electricity prices, indicating an excess supply. The 
latter is referred to as the incompressibility of power systems 
and is observed in Belgium with hours showing negative 
electricity prices on day-ahead, intra-day, and the real-time 
imbalance market [6], reflecting the difficulty to cope with 
periods of high renewable generation during low demand 
periods. The ability to accurately forecast these negative price 
periods can obviously prove to be profitable, thereby 
facilitating the business case of new flexible technologies. 
As multiple studies [7-9] have already analyzed negative prices 
on forward and day-ahead markets, this paper focuses on the 
real-time Belgian imbalance market. This market reflects the 
deviations of the day-ahead and intra-day market expectations 
in the forward markets, and is bound by regulatory measures. 
First, section 2 discussed the Belgian imbalance market. 
Afterwards, section 3 provides a literature overview of negative 
electricity prices, while section 4 provides an overview of 
available electricity price forecasting tools. Finally, section 5 
analyzes the occurrence of negative imbalance prices in 
Belgium, and section 6  states the conclusion of this paper. 
II. THE BELGIAN IMBALANCE MARKET 
In European power systems, prediction errors on both the 
demand and supply side of the  electricity market are dealt with 
on the balancing market. The Belgian TSO ‘Elia’, operates on 
both the procurement and the settlement side of the balancing 
market. On the procurement side it calculates the total system 
imbalance resulting from the aggregated imbalances of all 
                                                          
1 BRPs facing a negative imbalance in real-time hold a short 
position, BRPs facing a positive imbalance hold a long position. 
Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs), and compensates this 
imbalance by activating reserve capacity provided by BSPs. 
Reserve capacity is periodically procured from mainly 
conventional power units, and can be quickly activated in real-
time to cover system imbalances. Next to these “guaranteed” 
contracted reserves, additional capacity “free bids” can be 
contracted on day-ahead basis. This results in a merit-order 
representing the activation cost of reserve capacity [10-13]. 
On the settlement side, the TSO settles imbalances with the 
BRPs by applying a tariff, the imbalance price, to their 
imbalanced positions. This settlement mechanism determines 
how balancing costs are distributed and how incentives are 
given to BRPs. In Belgium, a single-pricing scheme is applied, 
in which the imbalance price reflects the marginal activation 
cost of reserves, being downward or upward reserves depending 
on the status of the system. Thus the ‘same’ imbalance price is 
applied for short and long positions1. However, this price is not 
always the same for long and short positions, as imbalance 
prices must provide an incentive to BRPs to maintain balance 
in their perimeter. Therefore, in the event of big structural 
imbalances, an additional incentivizing α-component is applied 
to ‘punish’ the BRPs causing the system imbalance, calculated 
on the basis of the total system imbalance. This may result in a 
different imbalance price for BRPs facing a negative imbalance 
and BRPs facing a positive imbalance. The Belgian imbalance 
prices are calculated every 15 minutes. 
In contrary, when using a dual-pricing scheme (e.g. in France), 
a different price is used for positive and negative imbalances. 
While imbalances contributing to the system imbalance are 
usually settled at prices based on the average procurement costs 
of balancing services, BRP imbalances counteracting the 
system imbalance are settled based on wholesale power 
exchange prices [12-14]. In a dual pricing-scheme, negative 
imbalance prices can thus only occur in periods experiencing a 
negative weighted average price, which only occurs in extreme 
circumstances. Thus, average pricing typically results in less 
negative prices. However, marginal pricing is believed to 
reflect the current market situation better than average pricing. 
 
Negative imbalance prices, in which the TSO pays the BSP, can 
only occur in case of a positive system imbalance, in which 
downward reserves are activated. These reserves represent 
power plants willing to lower their power output, and since their 
energy is already sold in the forward market, they are usually 
willing to pay the TSO an amount representing their saved 
operating costs. In this case the TSO compensates the BRP 
having an excess supply. However, downward flexibility 
providers may also bid negative activation prices, through 
which they are paid for lowering their power output. In this case 
the BRPs facing a positive imbalance have to compensate the 
TSO instead of being paid for their excess supply [10,14,15].  
These negative imbalance prices are then applied to BRPs 
experiencing an imbalance in their perimeter. If its imbalance 
reduces the general imbalance in the control area (a negative 
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imbalance), it has to pay the negative imbalance price to the 
TSO for his generation shortage, leading to a revenue. If its 
imbalance contributes to the system imbalance (a positive 
imbalance), it receives the negative imbalance price from the 
TSO for his excess generation, leading to a loss.  If in this case 
there is a major structural system imbalance, the price is further 
decreased by applying the additional incentivizing price α-
component [14]. 
III. NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Previous studies concerning negative electricity prices 
[8,9,16] attribute the occurrence of these prices to either high 
renewables generation, low system load, opportunity costs for 
inflexible conventional power plants with limited ramping 
capabilities, or a combination of the previous factors. 
According to the Belgian TSO, limited downward flexibility is 
also induced by the fact that not all excess energy can be 
evacuated because of limited export capacities [16]. Finally, as 
conventional power units are currently mainly used for 
balancing and providing balancing power, and as they are being 
replaced by renewable generation capacity, limited downward 
reserve capacity is observed in electricity markets, leading to 
negative imbalance prices [11]. 
The ongoing large-scale RES deployment increases the need for 
additional balancing needs, both upward and downward [17]. 
Concerning the inflexible conventional power plants, the 
studies emphasize that there will be less flexibility as there are 
more base-load units operating, as these units require a high 
utilization rate to cover high capital costs, and are not designed 
for ramping up and down regularly. In addition, tight downward 
flexibility can also occur when the units that are online cannot 
shut down because they have to provide reserve capacity, have 
very high start-up costs, or have opportunity costs because of 
prices above variable costs in the following hours and the fact 
that the inflexible units cannot start-up in time. The occurrence 
of negative imbalance prices can be seen as a market signal 
representing a relative scarcity of cheap downward flexibility 
when facing positive system imbalances.  
IV. FORECASTING ELECTRICITY PRICES 
This section provides an overview of electricity price 
forecasting techniques, which could be applied to forecast and 
analyze the occurrence of negative imbalance prices. The most 
recurring models can be attributed to regressive, autoregressive, 
neural network, or unit commitment techniques. However, it 
should be noted that forecasting electricity price movements 
remains a complex challenge, arising from a multitude of 
distinctive electricity market characteristics [18-20].  
A. Regressive techniques 
A regression analysis tests a set of independent variables 𝑋𝑖 
(e.g. load) for their impact on the dependent variable 𝑃𝑡. It show 
the presence of a positive/negative relation between the 
independent and dependent variables, and the percentage of the 
variance in the dependent variable that is explained by each 
independent variable. The significance of the independent 
variables is identified through a correlation analysis [21,22].  
 
     𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑋1 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑋2 + 𝑑 ∙ 𝑋3 + ⋯   ∀𝑡     (1) 
B. Autoregressive techniques 
Autoregressive (AR) forecasting models are based on the 
assumption that future price levels 𝑃𝑡  can be predicted based on 
past price levels 𝑃𝑡−𝑖, as many observed time series exhibit 
serial autocorrelation. These models are described in [23-25]. 
An AR model depending on ‘m’ past observations is called an 
AR model of degree ‘m’, and has regression parameters a, b, c, 
d depending on the weights and sign of the previous price 
levels. The basis of these models is shown by (2), in which the 
number of lags depends on the used data. In addition, such 
models can be extended with j exogenous variables 𝑋𝑗,𝑡−𝑘, 
represented by (3). Exogenous variables could for example be 
the demand, generated wind power, gas price, etc. Inaccuracies 
increase as the degree ‘m’ increases. 
 
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑏 ∙ 𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃𝑡−3 + ⋯   ∀𝑡        (2) 
 
            𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑎 ∙ ∑ 𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑏 ∙ ∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑗,𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑖     ∀𝑡             (3) 
C. Neural network techniques 
Neural Networks (NN) can model complex nonlinear systems, 
and are composed of an input layer, one or more hidden layers, 
and an output layer (Fig.1). They are mathematical models that 
resemble the functioning of the human brain. Two similarities 
are the fact that knowledge is gained by looping through a 
learning process, and that the network is connected through a 
set of nodes, called neurons. NNs consist of 2 parts, being a 
training phase and a forecasting phase, which are both 
improved through a feedback mechanism. The two methods for 
selecting the ‘best’ days for the training phase are the similar 
days method, based on a predetermined parameter (e.g. system 
load), and the identical days method (e.g. training an NN by 
previous Fridays when forecasting the next Friday). These 
models are described in [26-28].  
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of an NN model with n inputs, one hidden layer, and 1 
output [29]. 
D. Unit commitment techniques 
Unit Commitment (UC) models can be described as short-term 
power plant scheduling models with inelastic demand and a 
single objective representing optimizing behavior [30,31]. They 
decide when to start and shut down units as to minimize total 
electricity generation costs and maintain reliability, given 
demand forecasts and available units. The scheduling of power 
plants is constrained by their maximum and minimum output 
levels, ramp rates, and minimum up and down times.  
The UC model determines the scheduling of power plants 
according to a merit order ranking, being the power plants with 
the lowest variable costs, but considering technical constraints. 
The price can be forecasted as the marginal cost of the system, 
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as it is the cost of producing the marginal MW which ultimately 
is the market-clearing price. In other words, the price is the dual 
value of the market-clearing constraint. 
Generally, the objective function (4) minimizes the total 
generation costs to meet demand by taking into account the fuel, 
CO2 emission and start-up costs. The fuel consumption 𝐹𝑡,𝑖 
(expressed in [GJ]) in terms of electrical output represents the 
input-output characteristic of a generating unit i in hour t. Based 
on this, the variable generation costs are calculated by means of 
the fuel cost 𝑓𝑐𝑖 and CO2 emission cost 𝑐𝑐𝑖  per GJ for each 
technology. Next, every time a generation unit is started a 
technology specific fixed start-up fuel 𝑆𝑈𝐹𝑡,𝑖 is consumed. This 
variable is only positive when the commitment of the 
generating unit i in hour t changes from 0 to 1, compared to the 
previous period. Again, the total start-up costs are calculated by 
means of the fuel and CO2 emission cost.  
 
Min Cost ∑ 𝐹𝑡,𝑖 ∙ (𝑓𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖) + ∑ 𝑆𝑈𝐹𝑡,𝑖 ∙ (𝑓𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖)   𝑡,𝑖𝑡,𝑖 (4) 
 
These electricity price forecasting tools are based on either 
historical data, explanatory parameters, or underlying technical 
characteristics. However, they are unable to take regulatory 
measures and market design into account, which influence 
imbalance prices to a large extent. As optimal imbalance price 
forecasting needs to take both algorithmic and market design 
aspects into account, section 5 analyzes the reserve market 
design drivers for negative imbalance prices in Belgium. 
V. ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE BELGIAN IMBALANCE PRICES 
When analyzing the Belgian imbalance prices during the one-
year period from the 1st of January 2013 until the 31st of 
December 2013, it can be noted that the imbalance price for 
positive imbalances is negative in 6.58 % of the time, and for 
negative imbalances in only 1.25 % of the time. As explained 
in section 2, the difference between both prices is the α-
component, punishing the actors causing the system imbalance. 
Fig.2 illustrates the negative imbalance price duration curve for 
2013 for both the imbalance prices. The α-component is thus 
responsible for the area between both curves. The dark gray 
curve shows the negative imbalance price relating to a short 
position of the BRP. It reflects the price of the marginally 
activated downward reserve bid. The light gray curve shows the 
negative imbalance price relating to a long position of the BRP. 
It reflects the price of the marginally activated downward 
reserve bid, further reduced by the α-component [32].  
 
Fig. 2. The Belgian negative imbalance price duration curve for 2013 [32]. 
In order to identify the reserve market design factors causing 
the negative imbalance prices, the different downward reserve 
product categories are identified and briefly discussed. 
First, since October 2013 the Belgian system imbalance is 
netted with other control zones through the International Grid 
Cooperation and Control (IGCC) framework. This framework 
currently avoids counteracting activation of balancing 
resources through real-time imbalance exchanges between 
control areas [10,33]. Instead of activating secondary reserve 
capacity (R2), the imbalance is exchanged via IGCC, but the 
theoretical R2 activation price defines the imbalance price. As 
the R2 activation prices may not be negative, no negative 
imbalance prices can occur by activating downward IGCC 
reserve capacity [34].  
Second, contracted downward secondary reserves (R2) are 
activated. As indicated in the previous paragraph, the activation 
prices for the R2 downward reserve product are capped by a 
floor of 0 €/MWh, and thus no negative imbalance prices can 
occur by activating downward R2 capacity, even after the IGCC 
imbalance netting potential is fully exploited [34].  
Third, non-contracted downward regulation reserves are being 
activated. Such decremental free bid can include both a positive 
and negative activation price. A positive sign implies that the 
BSP pays Elia for lowering its power output, and a negative 
sign implies that Elia pays the BSP for lowering its power 
output. The possibility for negative decremental bids is 
necessary during situations experiencing incompressibility of 
the power system, because the costs for ramping down can be 
significantly large [34]. Thus negative imbalance prices can 
occur by activating downward non-contracted reserve capacity. 
Fourth, downward tertiary reserves (R3) are activated, which 
are defined as emergency contracts with neighboring TSOs in 
Belgium. These reserves are only activated as a last resort, if 
the other reserve capacities are not sufficient to cover the 
system imbalance. If Elia activates this non-guaranteed 
downward reserve capacity from a neighboring TSO, the 
imbalance price is automatically set at at least a flat-rate of -100 
€/MWh [34]. This measure has been active since June 2012 
[33]. Thus negative imbalance prices occur by activating this 
downward reserve capacity product.  
The above described downward reserve products showed that 
negative imbalance prices can only occur by activating non-
contracted downward regulation reserves and emergency 
downward R3 reserve capacity from a neighboring TSO.  
In addition, by studying Fig.2, it can be noted that in the 
majority of negative imbalance price quarters, the negative 
price is directly caused by the α-component instead of the 
activation of a marginal downward reserve at a negative 
activation price. As stated in section 2, the α-component is 
applied to ‘punish’ the BRPs causing the system imbalance 
when facing large system imbalances (larger than 140 MW). 
To conclude, three market design factors responsible for the 
occurrence of negative imbalance prices can be identified for 
Belgium: (1) negative decremental bids from non-contracted 
reserve capacity, (2) Activated downward emergency capacity 
from neighboring TSOs, (3) The α-component turning positive 
or close-to-zero imbalance prices into negative ones. 
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When analyzing the reasons for the occurrence of negative 
imbalance prices from non-contracted decremental bids to a 
deeper level, it can be noted that negative decremental bids are 
submitted by BSPs not willing to lower their power output 
temporarily, except if their activation results in a positive cash 
flow. Renewable power generators have such an incentive 
because they lose a tradable green certificate (TGC) when 
curtailing the power injections from the renewable energy 
source. Also inflexible conventional power generators have this 
incentive because they face restricted ramp rates, minimum up 
and downtimes, and high startup costs for starting their power 
generation again after having shut down their plant. In Belgium 
these renewable power generators are wind power plants, as no 
large scale PV power plants are present. Table 2 displays the 
minimum guaranteed price for TGCs of onshore and offshore 
wind power, which they receive for each generated MW. It is 
easy to understand that these wind power plant operators are 
only willing to lower their power output if they are paid more 
than what they would receive for generating wind power. 
TABLE II. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR WIND POWER IN BELGIUM [35,36]. 
 
a € 107 for generation coming from the first 216 MW of installed capacity, €90 for generation coming 
from installed capacity above the first 216 MW; b € 80 for generation capacity in operation from before 
2010, € 90 for generation capacity in operation since 2010, € 93 for capacity in operation since 2013. 
 
When analyzing the wind power data publicly available at [37], 
it can be noted that the activated decremental bids of offshore 
and onshore wind amounted to respectively 24 quarters and 104 
quarters for 2013. The 24 activated offshore wind decremental 
bids were activated on four different days (08/09, 17/09, 25/12, 
and 29/12), while for onshore wind they occurred during 14 
days between September and December 2013.  
When combining this data with the imbalance price for negative 
imbalances at those moments, it is noted that when decremental 
bids of  only onshore wind were activated the imbalance price 
was -100 €/MWh in 90% of the cases, leading to the conclusion 
that they bid downward reserve capacity at this price and were 
the marginally accepted bid. When examining Table 2, this 
seems valid as the financial support (< -100 €/MWh) is lost by 
curtailing, but 100 €/MWh is received for curtailing. When 
combining the decremental bids data of offshore wind with the 
imbalance prices at those moments, it can be observed that 
when decremental bids of offshore wind farms were activated 
the imbalance price was -180 €/MWh, -265 €/MWh, -310 
€/MWh for respectively 38 %, 38 %, 21 % of the cases, leading 
to the conclusion that they bid downward reserve capacity at 
this price and were the marginally accepted bid. When looking 
at Table 2, this seems valid as the financial support (107/90 
€/MWh) is lost by curtailing, but more than this support is 
received for the curtailment of their power output. 
 
The inter-TSO emergency downward reserve capacity was 
activated in 52 quarters during the one-year period of 2013 [32]. 
As this activation results in an imbalance price of -100 €/MWh, 
it can be deduced that when the imbalance price amounted to 
this level at those moments, this downward reserve product was 
the marginally accepted bid. For 62 % of the quarters this was 
the case, and during the other quarters the price reached -265 
€/MWh or -180 €/MWh. Thus, in 38 % of these quarters these 
downward reserves were activated but were not the marginally 
accepted bid. 
 
When analyzing Fig.2 and the above described responsible 
market design drivers for the occurrence of negative imbalance 
prices, different segments along the duration curve can be 
identified based on these drivers, i.e. negative decremental bids, 
downward emergency capacity from neighboring TSOs, and 
the incentivizing α-component. Fig.3 displays the resulting 
segmented duration curve of the negative imbalance price for 
negative imbalances. If the α-component was the driving factor, 
no negative reserve capacity bids were activated, but activated 
positive or close-to-zero bids were converted to negative 
imbalance prices. This segment is displayed in black. If the 
inter-TSO downward reserve capacity was the driving factor, 
this resulted in an imbalance price of -100 €/MWh, illustrated 
in yellow. If the negative decremental bids were the driving 
factor, 3 sub segments can be identified. First, the activated 
onshore wind decremental bids were responsible for part of the 
observed imbalance prices of -100 €/MWh, illustrated in 
orange. Second, the activated offshore wind decremental bids 
were partly responsible for the -180 €/MWh, -265 €/MWh, and 
-310 €/MWh imbalance prices, illustrated in blue. Third, the 
remaining negative imbalance prices can be attributed to the 
activated negative downward reserve bids from inflexible 
conventional power generators. They are illustrated in gray. 
 
Fig. 3. Segmented negative imbalance price duration curve for 2013 [32]. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Because of the ongoing increase in variable RES, the need for 
power system flexibility is rising. Periods experiencing 
negative imbalance prices occur due to limited downward 
power system flexibility, also referred to as incompressibility. 
Multiple techniques exist to forecast these periods in order to 
take advantage of this phenomena, however they fail to include 
important regulatory-based reserve market design drivers. 
These are identified as (1) activated negative decremental bids 
from non-contracted reserve capacity, (2) activated downward 
emergency capacity from neighboring TSOs, and (3) the 
balance incentivizing α-component turning positive or close-to-
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zero activated decremental bids into negative imbalance prices. 
Therefore, optimal imbalance price forecasting tools should 
include both mathematical algorithmic and reserve market 
design parameters, which is identified as further research. 
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